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ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Administrative agencies, often called the ‘‘fourth branch,’’
are entities of government that make decisions within par-
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ticular substantive fields. Although these fields range over
the full spectrum of public concern, the specificity of
agencies’ focus distinguishes them from other decisionmaking entities in the constitutional structure—the judiciary, the presidency, the Congress, indeed the individual
citizen—each of which can be taken to have a scope of
interest as broad as imagination will allow.
Agencies are perceived and known as such virtually
without regard to their form or institutional location. They
may be independent agencies—that is, not associated with
any Article II executive department—which are generally
administered by officials protected by law from the President’s removal power. The Interstate Commerce Commission is such an agency, established over a century ago
to decide entry, rates, and standards of service in the field
of transportation. Alternatively, an agency may be found
deep within an executive department, as the Food and
Drug Administration is found within the Department of
Health and Human Services. Or an agency may be identified with a cabinet officer in his or her capacity as administrator of a program. Agencies may have a handful of
employees or they may have thousands. Large or small, they
may speak through single individuals or through multimember collegial bodies, usually known as commissions.
The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 serves as a
second-level constitution for agencies of the federal government, specifying procedures and structural relations
within and among them, and between them and other entities. But agencies are only presumptively subject to the
Administrative Procedure Act—the Selective Service system, for example, has been exempted by Congress—and
the act itself is in substantial part a restatement of the
combination of COMMON LAW and constitutional law known
as ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, which has been developing virtually since the beginning of the Republic in response to
agencies’ decision-making and enforcement activities.
Agencies have their origins as alternatives to Article III
courts, making decisions in suits between individuals and
to executive officials making decisions and seeking to enforce them in court suits. More recently agencies also have
been seen as alternatives to decision making by legislative
process through Congress and the President under Article
I. Agencies have thus presented a difficulty for constitutional thinking under Articles I and III, arguably absorbing functions reserved to Congress, the President, and the
judiciary. Agencies present a further difficulty under the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment when DUE
PROCESS OF LAW is identified with legislative substance and
court process.
The constitutional problem agencies pose has never
reached any kind of closure. Instead, it has remained a
tension in constitutional thought, unresolved because the
creation and the maintenance of agencies have proceeded
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from inadequacies perceived in both legislative and judicial decision making.
Courts do not investigate or plan. Courts are not
thought to display the resourcefulness of decision making
committed to the achievement of a particular substantive
end, such as workplace safety, nor the expertise of the
specialists’. Courts other than the Supreme Court do not
take initiative. There is widespread consensus, in fact, that
courts should remain neutral and general. Moreover, the
making of decisions in very large numbers of cases—those
cases produced, for example, by disability benefit claims
or the military draft—may be impeded by judicial process
to the point that delay alone decides issues and legislated
values are imperiled.
Congress also is not equipped to make any great number of particular decisions, and may be able to attend to a
field of concern only at long intervals. Furthermore, where
the unprecedented is faced, such as the discovery of radio
waves or of nuclear energy, Congress often cannot do
much more than define the field for decision. But legislators can foresee that failure to create a decision-making
agency in the field effectively consigns the decisions of
great public concern which will inevitably be made to individuals exercising powers under state laws of contract,
property, and corporations.
Thus the existence and activity of agencies is rooted
in felt necessity and is not the product of, or subject to,
independent development of CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY.
Nonetheless, SEPARATION OF POWERS, due process, and delegation concerns weave through determinations of internal agency structure and procedure made pursuant to
statutes establishing particular agencies or under the Administrative Procedure Act. The same constitutional concerns underlie arrangement and rearrangement of the
relations of the Judiciary, Congress, and the President to
and through agencies. The concerns become acute and
surface as explicit issues when Congress, seeking speed of
decision or protection of an agency’s initiative or planning,
limits access to courts for review of agency decisions—
partially or wholly precluding JUDICIAL REVIEW —or when
the judiciary, for similar reasons, independently constricts
STANDING to challenge an agency’s action. The same concerns surface when Congress proves incapable of making
even large choices of value within an agency’s field of decision and again when the courts or Congress demand deference to agency choices of value—‘‘deference,’’ in this
context, consisting of giving weight to what an agency says
is the law because the agency says it. Constitutional questions constantly attend agency use of informal procedures
in decision making. And constitutional questions both
spark and restrain efforts by units within the office of the
President, such as the OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
and by committees and individual members of Congress
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to intervene in an agency’s consideration of issues. The
LEGISLATIVE VETO, now disapproved on constitutional
grounds, is only one of the means of congressional and
executive involvement extending beyond formal participation in agency processes or the processes of judicial review.
The demands on agencies often press them to issue
statements, characterized as rules, explicitly limiting the
factors to be taken into account in a decision of a particular
kind. These rules may govern decisions by the agency itself or by individuals and corporate bodies within the
agency’s field. In their formation some public participation
may be allowed. Rule-making, if not peculiar to agencies,
is characteristic of them, and agencies make rules whether
or not explicitly authorized by statute to do so. But inasmuch as relevant factors for decision may then be excluded and decisions in particular cases may not be made
on their full merits under the governing statutes, constitutional questions of due process are presented when individuals affected by such decisions challenge them. Here,
too, justification is grounded in felt necessity, the acceptance of rough justice as preferable to the entire failure
of justice. In addition, the crystallization of an agency rule
is viewed as facilitating congressional reentry into a field
through debate of defined issues leading to focused statutory amendments.
The demands on agencies to do what other governmental bodies are not equipped to do have also led to
bureaucratic hierarchies within agencies. BUREAUCRACY
raises the fundamental question of responsibility in decision making. The constitutional shadow is that of arbitrariness—the making of decisions by individuals within an
agency who have not been delegated authority to make
them or responsibility for them, and the enforcement of
decisions that are not deliberately made but are rather the
outcome of contending forces within and outside the
agency. Congress and the courts have responded by establishing a body of administrative law judges, by requiring
records of evidence and explanations of decisions, by requiring personal decision making (one constitutional formula is ‘‘the one who decides must hear’’), and by
prohibiting various kinds of EX PARTE contacts with agency
decision makers. These responses to administrative bureaucracy have led in turn to fears that modern agencies
may be overjudicialized as a result of attention to constitutional concerns.
The principal influence of administrative agencies on
constitutional law is the impact of the form of legal
thought they have generated, which has differed from conventional doctrine over a substantial period of American
legal history. ‘‘Legality’’ in agency administration is not the
correctness of an outcome but rather the proper taking of
factors or values into account in the making of a decision.

There is little or no finality in administration: Decisions
frequently remain open to revision and to justified reversal. There is no real distinction between agency action and
agency inaction. The effects of agency decisions are examined and reexamined far beyond the bipolar limits of
the judicial case. Values are routinely recognized—sometimes identified as noneconomic—to which no private
claim can be made. In these respects, even though administrative law is evidently molded by constitutional concerns, administrative agencies may be considered seeds of
anticonstitutional thought, for standard constitutional
doctrine has maintained a markedly different structure of
presuppositions and dichotomies. In judicial review of
agencies the strong emphasis on the actualities of agency
decision making, in contrast to acceptance of formal regularity in constitutional review of other decision-making
bodies, contains further fundamental challenge. In large
perspective, there is in administrative law a vision of agencies and courts joined with each other and with Congress
in pursuit of evolving public values. This vision sits uneasily with an inherited vision, still alive in much constitutional thought, of government as invader of a private
sphere of rights that it is the duty of courts to guard. The
future of constitutional law will be guided in substantial
part by the way these competing visions and modes of
thought are integrated.
JOSEPH VINING
(1992)
(SEE ALSO: Appointing and Removal Power, Presidential.)
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